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Brill's Companion to the Reception of Socrates

Edited by

Christopher Moore

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Abbreviations

DK	Diels, H. and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. Berlin ^{6}1952
DL	Diogenes Laertius
PCG	Kassel, R. and C. Austin, *Poetai Comici Graeci*. Berlin 1983–91
SSR	Giannantoni, G., *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae*. Naples 1990
TGF	Snell, B., R. Kannicht, and S. Radt, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*. Göttingen 1971–2004

Other ancient abbreviations from the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Oxford ^{4}2012

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CHAPTER 4

Antisthenes' Portrayal of Socrates

Menahem Luz

Socrates' character is often identified with the haunting image dramatized so vividly in the dialogues of Plato and Xenophon. Yet a somewhat different image emerges from the fragments of Antisthenes of Athens (c. 446–366 BCE).[1] Celebrated as an author of philosophical dialogues himself, Antisthenes was considered by many ancients to have been the "true" representative of Socrates' philosophy.[2] To whatever extent their claim was correct, it is the purpose of the present chapter to examine whether Antisthenes' presentation of Socrates' thought can be taken as a serious counter-image to that found in Plato and Xenophon. I will open by discussing the extent to which Antisthenes had a longer and more personal acquaintance with Socrates than either of these two writers. We will then examine the role of his own philosophical scheme in the interpretation of his teacher's thought. The third section of this chapter will analyze the method of argumentation adopted by him in his lost dialogues. Although Socrates was not a principle speaker in most of them, a reconstruction of their style and structure may reveal how Antisthenes expected the characters in them to interact. In this respect too, his method of composition can be clearly contrasted with that of Plato and Xenophon.[3] The final section will examine those fragments of his dialogues where Socrates is specifically portrayed. Throughout, I will attempt to show how Antisthenes gives an alternative account of his teacher's example.

1 Fragments edited and annotated in Prince 2015 (with English translation); *SSR* V A and vol. 4.195–419. I confine my analysis only to testimonies citing Antisthenes by name and not to speculated references to him in the writings of Plato and other writers.

2 Frr. 43A–B, 44A. This view has sometimes been adopted in modern times (Popper 1966, 194; Meijer 2017, 22) and even critics of Popper grant Antisthenes a pivotal place in the Socratic tradition (Wild 1953, 29–30).

3 Although I will compare his method of argumentation to that of Plato and Xenophon, it is worth noting the works of other first-generation Socratics, including Aeschines of Sphettus (*SSR* VI A), Aristippus of Cyrene (IV A), and Euclid of Megara (II A). On the differences between them and the schools, see Field 1967, 158–74; Kahn 1998, 1–35; Döring 2011, 27–45; Zilioli 2015, xiii–xx.

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1 Antisthenes' Acquaintance with Socrates

In many ways, Antisthenes was not only longer but also better acquainted with Socrates than either Plato or Xenophon. Almost a generation older than them,[4] he had befriended their teacher when they were still children.[5] Thereafter, Socrates was said to have considered Antisthenes one of his inseparable followers, allegedly conversing with him on a daily basis.[6] Furthermore, Antisthenes' account of Socrates' actions during this period was at least partially based on personal recollection.[7] By contrast, Plato and Xenophon knew Socrates best in his later years and their account of this earlier period was derivative when not simply invented.[8] From a social point of view, Antisthenes was also much closer to his teacher than those two members of the wealthy gentry. Like Socrates, Antisthenes was of modest means, with origins in the industrial port of Piraeus.[9] From there he is said to have made the strenuous journey to the city on foot each day in order to converse with his teacher.[10] Later anecdotes spoke of a personal rivalry and friction between Antisthenes and Plato (frr. 147–149).

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4 Antisthenes was fifteen to twenty years older than both Plato (b. 429/423 BCE) and Xenophon (b. 430/425 BCE). See Kahn 1998, 4–9; Badian 2004, 33–40; Prince 2015, 46–119.

5 He first studied, then taught, sophistic rhetoric (DL 6.1–2), but became a pupil of Socrates by at least 422 BCE (fr. 82), when his conversation in Xen. *Symp.* 4.34–45 was supposedly held (Prince 2015, 285). Moreover, he must have been aware of Socrates' philosophical activity when his teacher was lampooned in Aristophanes' *Clouds* (performed 423 BCE) and probably earlier when Socrates noticed Antisthenes' courage at the Battle of Tanagra (426 BCE; fr. 3A = DL 6.1).

6 Socrates was said to have remarked that Antisthenes never left his side (Xen. *Mem.* 3.11.17), hence perhaps the later tradition that they met daily (fr. 12A = DL 6.2). Plato includes Antisthenes as a silent member of the group surrounding Socrates on the day of his execution (*Phd.* 59b = fr. 20A), from which Plato and other followers were absent.

7 He praised Socrates' action at the Battle of Delion in 424 BCE (fr. 200) and may even have witnessed it if Socrates' remark about Antisthenes' courage at the Battle of Tanagra mistakenly referred to the same campaign (Prince 2015, 34).

8 Plato's account of Socrates' military exploits (*Symp.* 221a) was written partly in response to Xenophon's *Symposium* (Danzig 2005, 331–357) and to Antisthenes (Luz 2014, 9–22; Prince 2015, 256), to whom Xenophon also responds (fr. 103C = *Mem.* 1.2.19).

9 Frr. 81A, 82 (34). He may not have been as poor (*penês*) as Xenophon makes him claim to be (*Symp.* 3.8), but rather of merchant (fr. 6) or *metic* family; still, he was forced to earn a living before he met Socrates (Prince 2015, 45–6, 278–81). It is unlikely that he was a son of the wealthy Antisthenes of Cytherus (discussion in Nails 2002, 35–6), since his asides refer to moderate means (fr. 82), though he probably never lived in Cynic penury, as later admirers claimed.

10 Fr. 12A = DL 6.2. In contrast to the equestrian class of Xenophon and Plato, Antisthenes and Socrates had been hoplite foot-soldiers and anecdotes dwell on the lengthy walking abilities of both.

Whatever their truth, Plato himself makes no explicit reference to Antisthenes' contribution to philosophical discussion, barely mentioning his existence among Socrates' companions.[11] Xenophon, on the other hand, does give a long and detailed account of Antisthenes' active participation in conversations with Socrates. He has Antisthenes described as acknowledging a philosophical debt to his teacher, claiming to have learned from him the value of true friendship.[12] We must remember, however, that Xenophon does not depict a specific conversation held in the distant past, but rather invents an imaginary dialogue to present ideas associated with Socrates and his companions in general.[13] Still, it is unlikely that he would have put concepts into Antisthenes' mouth that completely contradicted what was generally known of him.[14] Whatever the exact origin of Xenophon's account, he obviously recognizes Antisthenes' early and intimate place among Socrates' followers.

Within a generation of his death, some considered Antisthenes the only Socratic writer worthy of admiration.[15] Although few of his compositions were in fact Socratic dialogues,[16] his presentation of Socrates' philosophy of friendship and wealth of spirit led many early Cynics to imagine that he was one of the founding figures of their own philosophy of penury and social harmony.[17] Antisthenes was thus made into a pivotal link between Socrates and thinkers of the Greco-Roman period.[18]

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11 Admittedly this is true of Plato's treatment of several other Socratics as well (Tsouna 2015, 3–5) and it is unclear why some and not others.

12 Xen. *Symp.* 3.7, 4.34, 62, 63; *Mem.* 2.5.1.

13 Xenophon is often judged a mere imitator of Plato and Antisthenes (Kahn 1998, 393–401; Huss 1999, 18), although his originality has recently been defended (Dorion 2014, 291–292; Chernyakhovskaya 2014, 4–7). It is also suggested that his encounter with Callias in Corinth in 371 BCE (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.3–4) may have inspired the general topic of Callias' banquet in Xen. *Symp.* (Nails 2002, 72 [s.v. Callias III]; Prince 2015, 285), though we should not forget that this work is not a recollection of an actual event from his early childhood, but inventive sympotic literature.

14 Antisthenes' works continued to be read long after, arousing both critical interest in Aristotle as well as admiration among his "Antisthenean" followers (Arist. *Metaph.* H.4 1043b23 = frr. 150A 4, 150B 1).

15 Theopompus of Chios (378/7–*c.* 320 BCE) composed an anti-Platonic diatribe, where Antisthenes was admired not only for the clever (*deinos*) acumen and harmony (*homilia*) of his philosophical discourse, but also as the only (*monos*) Socratic author who was worthy of praise (frr. 22A = DL 6.14).

16 Some were rhetorical speeches and others were discourses on what we would now call logic and metaphysics. Cf. frr. 22A, 42, 43B (= DL 6.14, 2.61, 64). See Suvák 2014, 72–120; Prince 2015, 179; Brancacci 2015, 43–45.

17 Fr. 22A (DL 6.13–14). Discussion in Branham and Goulet-Cazé 1996, 6–7; Long 1996, 31–41; 2005, 623–9; 2006, 58–9.

18 Discussions of various aspects of his influence in Suvák 2014, especially Fuentes Gonzáles 2014, 54–5.

2 Antisthenes' Portrayal of Socrates

Although the portrayal of Socrates' character by his disciples has a direct bearing on the largely insoluble question of what that philosopher was originally like,[19] we will here confine ourselves to examining how and why Antisthenes presented his teacher's thought in the way that he did.[20] In principle, the portrait of Socrates in his disciples' works reflects not only what they absorbed from his thought, but also the extent to which they tailored their accounts to convey a new philosophical message to their readers.[21] Even Aristotle noticed this distinction between Plato's thought and the philosophy of the historical Socrates.[22] While much of Aristotle's knowledge of Socrates was based on Plato, he was aware of the writings of other Socratic writers as well.[23] What has interested modern scholars is the way in which Plato and Xenophon transformed their master's image when they composed a Socratic dialogue.[24] Something similar may explain the portrayal of Socrates in the fragments of Antisthenes. The moral qualities used to describe his teacher were precisely those that characterize Antisthenes' own philosophy: Socrates'

19 Waterfield 2004, 86–93 and more negatively, Dorion 2011, 20–1.

20 Scholars have long attempted to unravel Socrates' character by extracting what is common to ancient accounts of his doctrine (Guthrie 1971, 7–9; Stone 1989, 9–19; Brickhouse and Smith 1991, 45–62), his dialectical method (Gulley 1968, 1–74), and thought (Gigon 1947, 7–68; Taylor 1953, 131–73). However, not only does Aristophanes' critique of Socrates contradict the idealization of him in Plato and Xenophon (Vander Waerdt 1994, 49–86), but the Socratic writers themselves often disagree on important aspects of his character (Guthrie 1971, 5–28; Dorion 2011, 1–23).

21 On the origins of the Socratic dialogue, see Redfield 2018, 125–40. On Plato's presentation of Socrates, see the articles in Press 2000, 15–82, 201–34; on that of other Socratics, see Clay 1994, 23–47; Kahn 1998, 1–18; Zilioli 2015, 1–142. Although Plato may have often identified with the views ascribed to Socrates in his dialogues (Rowe 2009, 20), scholars sometimes loosely identify the historical Socrates' thought with its presentation in Plato or some other Socratic writer without drawing a clear distinction between master and pupil (e.g., the articles listed in Boudouris 1991, 9–10; Vlastos 1997, ch. 2; Kofman 1998, 1–31).

22 He distinguishes between Socrates' views on universals and Plato's own ontological theory (*Metaph.* A.6 987b1–14, M.4 1078b23–4, 9 1086b2–5), that was nonetheless expressed through the character of "Socrates" in the dialogues (Ross 1924, xxxvi–xxxvii; Dorion 2011, 11 n. 29). His distinction may even have been indicated lexically ("Fitzgerald's canon"), though this usage may not be as hard and fast as originally suggested (Ross 1924, xxxix–xl). See further Smith 2018, 601–22; Moore (in this volume), 175.

23 Dorion 2011, 11. In his analysis of the literary origins of the Socratic dialogue, Aristotle refers to a multiplicity of *logoi* about Socrates (*Poet.* 1447b11), intending not only those of Plato but other authors as well (Murphy 2013, 316, n. 13).

24 On "Plato' reinterpretation of Socrates," see Rutherford 1995, ch. 2; Kahn 1998, 95–100; Hintikka 2007, 2–3. Reappraisals of Xenophon's inventive recreation of Socrates are in Chernyakhovskaya 2014, 4–7; Dorion 2014, 291–2. On Antisthenes' interpretation of Socrates, see Suvák 2014, 72–120; Brancacci 2015, 43–60.

inner strength (*to karterikon*, fr. 12A) and wealth (*ploutos*) of spirit (fr. 82). There Socrates resembles a wise counselor rather than the argumentative figure of Plato's so-called "aporetic" dialogues.[25]

While Antisthenes' presentation of Socrates' philosophy in dialogue form was common to that of other Socratic writers, he differed from them in a number of important points. His dialogues encompassed imaginary conversations held not only between Socrates and his contemporaries, but also between characters of semi-historical and mythological origin.[26] This breadth of style meant that Antisthenes was like Xenophon: a much more diversified writer than Plato and one more difficult to define.[27] Moreover, he appears to have adopted a style of dialogue distinct from either writer. While each of Plato's dialogues purportedly describes a separate conversation held between Socrates and various contemporaries,[28] Xenophon is best known for composing collections of assorted conversations held between them.[29] By contrast with both, Antisthenes' style was less unified and, as we shall see, more episodic in structure, citing snippets of conversations in order to exemplify Socrates' character.

3 Antisthenes' Rhetorical Style

An important element of Antisthenes' method of argumentation was the use of rhetoric, and in this he stands in clear contrast to Plato. Ancient accounts of Antisthenes' life relate that prior to having met Socrates he gave lessons in sophistic oratory (fr. 12B–C). Whether these stories are late fiction or not,

25 These often end with a portrayal of Socrates caught in a philosophical impasse (Gulley 1968, 22–61; Kahn 1998, 95–100) that may reflect Plato's own uncertainty concerning the value of sensation and the definition of virtue in rather than that of the historical Socrates (Vander Waerdt 1994, 9–10; Kahn 1998, 1–2; Hintikka 2007, 2–3).

26 E.g., between Heracles and Prometheus, Achilles and Chiron, and King Cyrus and his courtiers (Prince 2015, 144–5).

27 Plato was "limited to the Socratic form" (Clay 1994, 28) in contrast to Antisthenes, who composed not only dialogues, but also speeches in the style of the sophists as well as discursive analyses that attracted the critical attention of Aristotle.

28 This is also true of those dialogues introduced by a brief conversation supposedly held subsequent to the main discussion of the dialogue (e.g., *Phd.* 57a–59e; *Tht.* 142a–143c; *Symp.* 172a–173e). The same was probably true of Aeschines' dialogues, whose fragments indicate brief introductions where Socrates narrated the dialogues some time after they were originally held (Döring 2011, 28–33; Lampe 2015, 61–67).

29 Xen. *Mem.* 1–4. Although his *Symposium* comprises a collection of separate conversations, it is purportedly a record of a single event (Callias' banquet). The Socratic conversations in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* are more unified structurally, but less dramatic in form.

our sources note how his dialogues and even discursive works reflected the rhetorical style of the sophist giant, Gorgias of Leontini (c. 485–c. 380 BCE). In fact, we can detect the influence of Gorgias' mythological themes and language in many of Antisthenes' surviving fragments.[30] However, Antisthenes' belief in the absolute value of morality was in no way compatible with Gorgias' relativistic if not nihilist mode of thought.[31] His theory of moral education may even have been attacked by Gorgias' illustrious pupil, the rhetorician Isocrates.[32] On the other hand, the very adoption of sophistic rhetoric as a viable method of argumentation sets Antisthenes in sharp contrast to Plato. While it is true that Plato sometimes composed speeches for the character of Socrates to deliver in his dialogues, these tend to be either in the form of parody or, if of more serious intent, expositions of myths subservient to dialectical *logos*.[33] More importantly, Plato portrays Socrates as consistently critical of the sophists and the philosophy of rhetoric associated with Gorgias and Protagoras in particular. There Socrates attempts to solve philosophical problems through a process of cross-examination of his companions by means of short questions and even briefer answers (*brachulogia*) rather than by means of instruction given in the longer lecture (*makrologia*) format associated with the leading sophists.[34] Although Plato later experimented with other ways to solve Socrates' *aporia*, he still presented these new methods as viable alternatives to the sophists' method of rhetoric.[35] Antisthenes' fragments, on the other hand,

30 Ancient sources said that Antisthenes' dialogue *Truth* was composed in a "rhetorical style" (Prince 2015, 147–8), as were his series of *Protreptic* works (137–8). More specifically we may compare his surviving epideictic speeches delivered by characters of mythology—*Ajax* (fr. 53) and *Odysseus* (fr. 54)—to Gorgias' *Defense of Helen* and *Palamedes* (Waterfield 2000, 228–31; Dillon and Gergel 2003, 76–84, 84–93).

31 On Gorgias' philosophy, see Guthrie 1971, 273–4; Dillon and Gergel 2003, 66–76. His moral and political philosophy was based on the principle that any action is justified by the necessity of its circumstances (fr. 6.18 DK: τὸ δέον ἐν τῷ δέοντι) and its present timing (fr. 6.11a DK: ὁ παρὼν καιρός). His nihilism is set forth in the semi-serious *On Not-Being*: nothing exists, hence we cannot know it—therefore, we cannot teach it (fr. 3 DK).

32 The case for interpreting Isocrates' *Against the Sophists* 1–2 as an attack on Antisthenes' theory of moral education and discourse has been renewed by Murphy (2013), 330–1; Brancacci 2015, 46–8.

33 Brisson 1998, 87–115. Although Plato sometimes made Socrates "a master" of formal speech (Woodruff 2011, 106–7), this was usually reserved for his rivals to be dissected by him in dialectical cross-examination.

34 This is particularly true of his shorter *aporetic* dialogues, but also of the more complex: *Prt.* 335b; *Grg.* 449c.

35 E.g., the methods of *anamnesis* ("recollection") and *hypothesis* in *Meno* 81b–85e, 87a–b; *Phd.* 100, or the method of *diairesis* in the *Sophist*, *Statesman*, and *Philebus*.

give little evidence for Plato's interpretation of Socrates' methods of dialectic.[36] We see this not only from the tenets of his philosophy, but also from the argumentation used by the characters of his dialogues:

1. The term *brachulogos* was used by Antisthenes to delineate the required brevity and simplicity of moral instruction rather than brief dialectical responses: virtue is imparted by means of a persuasive but brief explanation (*brachulogos*) in contrast to the limitless (*aperantos*/*aperantologos*) devices for justifying evil (fr. 104A).[37]
2. His examination (*episkepsis*) of the names of concepts (fr. 160) is concluded by an understanding of the proper account (*oikeios logos*) for each *definiendum* (fr. 152A). By contrast, Plato's interpretation of Socrates' dialectical examination (*dialegomenou … exetazontos*) is as a lifelong occupation (*Ap.* 38a)[38] and the *definiendum* may never be completely grasped.[39]
3. Even the characters in several of Antisthenes' mythological and historicizing dialogues explain their thought through set speeches rather than through Plato's Socratic method of short questions and answers.[40]

Although we do not know the extent to which Antisthenes employed this rhetorical mannerism in his Socratic dialogues, Xenophon saw fit to invent a rhetorical presentation speech to be delivered by Antisthenes in praise of Socrates, his master and friend.[41] While scholars dispute the percentage of Xenophon's content derived directly from Antisthenes' works, there is every reason to accept the general tenor of this passage: Antisthenes regarded

36 As we shall see, Plato's use of dialectical refutation was not only methodically different from Antisthenes' understanding of elenctic contradiction (Prince 2015, 153), but also philosophically incompatible with it. Moreover, Antisthenes' work *On Questioning and Answering* (fr. 41.40 = DL 6.17) was probably not an examination of the dialectic portrayed in Plato's dialogues, but similar to his examination of eristics listed alongside it in ancient lists of his works (DL 6.17).

37 If Prince's assignment of fr. 104B to Antisthenes is correct then he claimed that Athenian loquacity (*multa dicere*) was a sign of ethical ignorance standing in contrast to the Laconic utterance of only what suffices to be said (*quid esset satis*).

38 On the comparison of Antisthenes' *episkepsis* with Plato's *exetasis*, see Brancacci 2015, 47–8; Prince 2015, 543–4.

39 While Plato's Socrates entertains doubts concerning the acquisition of full knowledge in this life (Kahn 1998, 162–3) in contrast to true opinion (Robinson ^{2}1995, xviii, 129), Antisthenes' philosophy was more this-worldly.

40 Cf. fr. 96, from a set speech delivered by the Titan Prometheus criticizing Heracles' quest for worldly values (Prince 2015, 329–31).

41 Xen. *Symp.* 4.34–44, where Antisthenes classifies his "presentation" as epideictic (43), with all of the rhetorical nuance entailed in this term.

Socrates as a philosopher worthy of formal, if not rhetorical, praise.[42] Plato would probably agree with the praise but not with its rhetorical manner of presentation.

We may conclude that one important element of Antisthenes' method of argumentation was the use of moral instruction delivered in the form of a character's set-speech and terminating in the proper account of moral concepts. Although he thus differed from Plato's presentation of Socrates' philosophy, they both would have agreed on the need for criticizing the relativistic morality sponsored by the sophists Protagoras and Gorgias.

4 Dialectical Exchange in Antisthenes' Works

Alongside this rhetorical element, there is also evidence for Antisthenes' use of dialectical exchange. In a fragment possibly derived from his *Alcibiades*, there is a brief sketch of a conversation held between Socrates and unnamed "strangers" (fr. 200). Two further sketchy conversations may be derived from this same dialogue. In the first, Socrates argues with unnamed "strangers" concerning Alcibiades' failure as his "pupil"; immediately following it, Antisthenes describes his involvement in a dialectical exchange with unnamed critics concerning a failed follower of his own (fr. 175).[43] We also have Xenophon's accounts:

1. A discussion held between Socrates and Antisthenes in the form of a short protreptic dialogue of philosophical encouragement (*Mem.* 2.5.1);[44]
2. a brief exchange concerning the role of education in Socrates' household (*Symp.* 2.9–14);
3. a more detailed exchange between Socrates and Antisthenes concerning the latter's role as his "follower," where he also summarizes his own views on morality (*Symp.* 3.8, 4.1–5).

Xenophon's first two accounts of Antisthenes' meetings with Socrates are similar in style to the sketchy conversations from Antisthenes' works discussed above in that they all lack detailed characterization concerning the participants and circumstances of their meeting. Antisthenes' sketches would have stood in complete contrast to the complex dramatic detail of Plato's

42 Both points are expanded upon by Suvák 2014, 72–8.

43 Text and discussion in Luz 2015, 197–202.

44 Xenophon does not state that he was actually present himself, but that he heard (*êkousa*) about a conversation (*logon*) between Socrates and Antisthenes. Perhaps its source was in Antisthenes' series of discourses and dialogues known as the *Protrepticus* where Socrates was cited (fr. 64A).

masterpieces.[45] Although the dialogue structure of both writers originates in drama, Antisthenes' simple sketches are closer to the very nascence of the Socratic dialogue in dramatic mime.[46] Moreover, while the style of Plato's earlier dialogues often resembles the short stichomythic exchanges between characters of Greek tragedy and comedy, that used in Antisthenes' *Heracles* is more akin to the extended rhetorical address of a character to the chorus. We may at least conclude that some of Antisthenes' dialogues comprised brief, undetailed, dialectical exchanges set between longer rhetorical speeches or clarifications. Unlike Plato's, it does remind us of Xenophon, whose *Memorabilia* is basically a collection of short, uncharacterized sketches of Socratic conversations, composed in a simple dialectic style.[47] Given Antisthenes' chronological priority to Plato and Xenophon, it is fair to presume that his dialogical compositions would have antedated some of their works as well.[48] Nonetheless, even those written in response to Plato would seem to have been unaffected by the latter's detailed dramatic style.

We should now briefly examine the method of argumentation employed in Antisthenes' dialectic exchanges as well as their epistemological implications. In Plato's shorter aporetic dialogues, an important stage of the argument is devoted to Socrates' "refutation" (*elenchus*) of his opponent in the discussion. Having questioned his interlocutor concerning a particular philosophical issue, such as "what is piety?" or "what is courage?," Socrates then raises a number of short subsidiary questions in order to undermine either his interlocutor's assumptions or even the logical validity of the entire discussion. In either case the *elenchus* could be directed against a self-contradiction resulting from their assumptions or even evolving from Socrates' own reasoning. For Antisthenes, however, the whole notion of *elenchus* was precluded in principle since he denied the possibility of making a valid contradiction on any subject: "it is impossible to contradict."[49] The justification for adopting

45 On Plato's dialogues as dramatic compositions, where the literary characterization of the speakers is inseperable from their philosophical discussion, see Rutherford 1995, 10–15; Rowe 2009, 11.

46 On the origin of the Socratic dialogue in dramatic mime, see Arist. *Poet.* 1447b10–11. Antisthenes' method of composition is described by Prince 2015, 683 as specifically displaying "a simple, unframed 'mime' structure."

47 Xenophon's *Symposium* is obviously more complex in literary form, perhaps even influencing Plato as much as it may have been influenced by him (Danzig 2005, 331–57).

48 See Kahn 1998, 19–20 n. 37.

49 Fr. 153A = Arist. *Top.* 104b 19–21: οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης. When he assumes that virtue is most indisputably (*anamphilogôtatê*) taught (Xen. *Symp.* 3.4; Fr. 78), he is precluding further contradiction. Attempts to dismiss Aristotle's testimony (Meijer 2017, 21–36) are unconvincing.

this principle is given in his statement that you must halt an opponent who raises a contradiction (*antilegonta*) against you not by inventing further contradictory arguments, but rather by teaching (*didaskein*) him, just as one does not cure a madman by counter-madness (*antimainomenos*).[50] The origin of his theory of non-contradiction is most easily explained as a rebuttal of Protagoras' proposition that argument (*logos*) and counter-argument (*antilogos*) were simultaneously valid.[51] In contrast to Protagoras' conclusions that truth was relative to the observer, only one proper account (*logos*) was true in Antisthenes' opinion (fr. 155), and only that could be enunciated with any meaningful validity. This proper account should simultaneously affirm and teach its *logos* in its own terms of reference, resulting in a form of self-predication: e.g., that the good is good and the shameful, shameful (fr. 195).[52] Moral virtue is of good deeds (*erga*) in the sense of chosen action,[53] but the simplicity of its explanation needs neither much argumentation (*pleistoi logoi*) nor studied lessons (fr. 134 d). If adhered to strictly, the principles of self-predication and the impossibility of contradiction would preclude not only Gorgias' attempt to justify any *logos* and action on the basis of its correct time and necessary circumstances, but would also preclude the sophist Prodicus' study of the multiple meanings of terms.[54] Moreover, Antisthenes' principles would also disallow Plato's presentation of Socrates' definition of the moral virtues in terms other than themselves.[55] Although Aristotle judges

50 Fr. 174. Antisthenes' argument is in the form of a Socratic *epagôgê* whereby contradiction is analogically compared to counter-madness. Implicitly, the *mania* of contradiction can be contrasted with the role of reason (*nous*) in Antisthenes' philosophy (fr. 105).

51 Protagoras claim for the equal validity of every argument and counter-argument was proposed not only in relation to ethical and theological beliefs, but also regarding sensation and non-sensation (e.g., honey as both sweet and sour, or the appearance and non-appearance of the moon). Cf. Gronewald 1968, 1–2; Dillon and Gergel 2003, 42 (fr. 29), 352 n. 136–7.

52 While our sources connect this aphorism with Antisthenes' answer to those who justified incest as argued in Euripides' *Aeolus* (Prince 2015, 669–70), it reflects not only his stand on absolute morality but also his logical assumptions (Luz 2000, 88–95; 2014, 185). It serves as an indirect reply to the intricate justification for adultery and deception set forth, for example, in Gorgias' epideictic speeches on behalf of Helen and Palamedes.

53 Prince 2014, 198. In the moral sphere, Antisthenes criticizes the incest of Cimon and his sister, Elpinice, and the latter's relationship with Pericles (fr. 143A) as well as Alcibiades' incestuous relationships (fr. 141A).

54 On the comparison with Prodicus: Prince 2015, 150–1. It is possible that Antisthenes' five books of discourses *On Education or On Names* discussed these points as well (fr. 41A) and were included in his *On the Use of Names or Eristic Discourse* (DL 6.17).

55 E.g., virtue as knowledge, or a unity reflecting it (Gulley 1968, 83–91, 151–164). Aristotle's criticism in *Eth. Nic.* 1144b28–30 was probably based on Plato's portrayal of Socrates.

these principles on the grounds of his own metaphysical presuppositions, he inadvertently illuminates the background of Antisthenes' original discussion. He claims that the Antistheneans denied synthetic (*sunthetos*) definition, thus locking themselves in a logical impasse (*aporia … eporoun*): they could teach only a thing's quality, but not what it was.[56] At least two points mentioned by Aristotle also remind us of Plato's account of Socrates' search for the meaning (*logos*) of virtue and his teacher's aporetic failure to achieve this. The first is Aristotle's assumption that the Antistheneans searched for the meaning (*logos*) of what something is; and the second was their logical impasse (*aporia*) resulting from a failure to reach a conclusion. It is thus likely that Antisthenes also portrayed Socrates involved in an aporetic search for the definition of the virtues. However, unlike Plato, he seems to have claimed that there were *logoi* whose true meaning could actually be taught (*didaktoi*), although further search beyond their basic meaning would lead to confusion (*aporia*).[57]

The dialectic of argumentation employed in Antisthenes' sketches would thus have excluded not only the cross-examination underlying Plato's portrayal of Socratic *brachulogos*, but also the analysis of contradictory arguments. In Antisthenes' view, the moral virtues should be imparted by brief instruction with an intuitive grasp by the student (e.g., fr. 96). This could have been exemplified by Socrates' character and actions or through his moral principles. However, judging from the brief sketch of fr. 200, Socrates' argument was not *presented* as a deductive interrogation typifying much of the argumentation in Plato's Socratic dialogues, but rather as a consecutive battery of short points for consideration.[58] This is not to deny the deductive element in their common conclusion concerning the value of virtue, but each of the battery of arguments could stand on its own in contrast to the multitude of deductive steps in a Platonic argument.

56 Fr. 150A = *Metaph.* 1043b4–5: they cannot define silver as it is in essence (b4)—that is, give both a material and formal account (b5–6)—for then such a *logos* would no longer be simple but rather synthetically long—so they can describe only what it is like, e.g., "like tin" (b4). However, as in other cases, Aristotle here raises a criticism on the presupposition of his own theory of formal and material causation. Despite this, one may reply to Aristotle that the Antistheneans did describe essence but in terms of self-identity (the shameful is shameful), and thus not in terms of additional qualities.

57 In Antisthenes' eyes, Socrates was an actual teacher (Xen. *Symp.* 4.59, 61); Plato, by contrast, denied that Socrates ever taught anything, lacking knowledge of his own (*Ap.* 19d–e).

58 Socrates' friends think him worthy of receiving a citation for valor in battle and though he denies receiving one, they further press that this was because he relinquished it in favor of Alcibiades (fr. 200).

In other ways, Antisthenes' dialectical style again appears to have served as a precedent for Xenophon rather than for Plato. His *Heracles* compositions have considerable interweaving of separate episodes.[59] He records Heracles' moral education at the school of Chiron (fr. 92A–E) as well as a chronologically separate encounter with the philosophical Titan Prometheus (fr. 96). Elsewhere, he describes not only events from Alcibiades' youth, but also a separate conversation concerning his army duty (fr. 200) as well as the immorality of his middle age, but apparently as part of a conversation concerning Cyrus (fr. 141A). These compositions would thus have not been confined by the dramatic strictures of a single period of conversation. In order to accomplish the same end, Plato has usually to include in the discussion a speaker's recollection of an earlier episode (e.g., *Sph.* 216a) or introductory remarks by a narrator (*Phd.* 57a–59c).

It has long been noted that Antisthenes would sometimes interrupt the flow of his dialogues to clarify the point discussed.[60] These interruptions are inserted between the characters' set-speeches[61] and possibly like Xenophon as part of the composition's introduction.[62] In either case, Antisthenes did this to state his position clearly on the matter under discussion. While other Socratic writers expressed a variety of opinions through the characters of the dialogues, Antisthenes chose to do this in his own voice as if he were a first-hand observer (*autoptês*) of, though not a participant in, the mythical or historical events described. In this respect, he obviously did not serve as a model for Plato, who neither participates in his own dialogues nor volunteers a personal opinion in any of them; but Antisthenes does serve as a precedent for Xenophon, who often introduces his Socratic conversations *in persona*.[63] Nonetheless, although Xenophon may interject remarks between sections of his works, he does not actually interrupt a conversation's flow in order to vouch his opinion on points

59 Scholars disagree concerning the unity of the three *Heracles* compositions ascribed to him. The fourth volume of his works includes *Heracles the Greater or On Strength* (DL 6.16); the tenth lists *Heracles or Midas* followed by *Heracles or On Prudence or Strength* (6.18). The last could be an epitome of the first, but all could be separate titles for different episodes in the same book.

60 Prince 2015, 329; an alternative view is in Murphy 2013, 335.

61 He refers to himself in the third person at the end of the Prometheus speech in the *Heracles*: "… as said Antisthenes" where the Syriac particle *lam* indicates an extended citation (fr. 96)—as also his description of Achilles' education under Chiron: "as Antisthenes said" (fr. 92A). In fr. 198, Antisthenes is described as αὐτὸς αὐτόπτης γεγονώς, of Alcibiades' character, which could reflect a remark made by Antisthenes in narrating the discussion much as Xenophon once did (*Symp.* 1.1).

62 Fr. 95: "he [Antisthenes] himself gazed at a tablet of painting of Achilles and said …".

63 E.g., *Mem.* 1.1.1, 20; 1.2.20–1, 62; 2.1.1, 10.1, etc.; *Oec.* 1.1; *Symp.* 1.1; *Ap.* 1, 34.

under discussion as Antisthenes did. In this sense, the latter apparently turned to the reader using his authorial position in order to reinforce the point in hand.[64] This style of composition has serious epistemological implications. Whether written as an interruption to the narrative or as an introduction to it, the author clarifies his philosophical meaning to the reader in no uncertain terms. In contrast to this stands the dramatic and philosophical impasse that Plato leaves the readers in his aporetic and sometimes non-aporetic dialogues. In both, they are often left with no clear solution from a dramatic and even philosophical point of view.[65] Plato is thus often interpreted as intending to force his readers to deduce the meaning on their own in lieu of a solution spelled out for them by him or even by Socrates. He discusses this very point in his examination of the double meaning of teaching and learning in his aporetic dialogue *Meno* (81c–d, 82a–b), where the sophists' inductive method of teaching is sharply contrasted with Socrates' method of deductive recollection (*anamnêsis*). Whereas the question whether virtue can be finally taught remains unresolved even in the *Meno* (99e–100c), we do know that Antisthenes explicitly stated that virtue was indeed teachable (*didaktê*) in one of his *Heracles* series of dialogues (fr. 99). He even interrupted one of them in order to praise the hero for joining the Centaur Chiron for the sake of instruction in virtue (fr. 92A–B). We see something similar at the close of the Prometheus episode of the *Heracles*, where the author does this to express his personal view of Heracles' quest (fr. 96). In all of these instances, Antisthenes suggests a solution to the action in the dialogue. He expects them not to deduce it by themselves but to grasp virtue intuitively after the briefest instruction (*brachulogos*): that the good is morally fine and the bad morally shameful. He not only insists that virtue is teachable (fr. 99), but that its true *logos* is to be attained. He thus could not have shared Plato's doubts concerning the attainment of moral knowledge, or lack of it as did Socrates in the Platonic dialogues.[66]

A further way in which Antisthenes directs the reader to a possible solution is by the use of parallel analogies. Aristotle ascribed its use to the historical Socrates under the term "inductive argumentation" although his knowledge of Socrates mostly relies on the Platonic dialogues.[67] At any rate, the Platonic

64 See Prince 2015, 678–9; Kahn 1998, 33.

65 In fact, Plato's portrayal of an *aporetic* Socrates has often been accepted as indicating the character of the historical Socrates as well (Vlastos 1997, ch. 2).

66 On Socrates as a type of skeptic or agnostic, see Gulley 1968, 62–74.

67 *Metaph.* M.4.1078b28–31. The term "inductive argument" (*epaktikos logos*) refers not to induction but to "arguments from analogy" (Ross 1924, 422) where similar cases are applicable (*epaktikos*) to prove a universal (xliii). On the unreliability of Aristotle's

Socrates frequently compares the quest for a general definition of virtue to the solution of a number of extraneous analogies as if the argument could be transferred from those examples to that of the virtues.[68] Whether or not this method belonged to the historical Socrates as well, Antisthenes' Socrates seems to have used philosophical analogy in a different way: in order to reinforce moral assertions rather than to prove a universal based on particular instances. Thus, Antisthenes asserts that virtue once acquired is a protective wall that cannot fall, or that it is a shield that cannot be lost.[69] The analogy of virtue as an actual weapon (*xiphos*) for the defense of the virtuous seems to be an extension of this analogy.[70] Although they are preserved as similes and metaphors descriptive of the function of virtue, we should not forget that they are meant to serve as analogies for its moral instruction.[71] Thus, although Plato and Antisthenes both portray Socrates' search for the meaning of virtue, they differ regarding its acquisition: for Plato it is to be attained through dialectic deduction in the form of recollection; for Antisthenes it is to be attained through instruction by means of analogy.[72]

Socratic irony is also an important feature of the Platonic dialogue. Although there are places where Socrates is ironic in the modern sense of the word, Plato also uses *eirôneia*—or the claim not to know when one does—as an important prop for the epistemological scenery of his dialogues.[73] While Antisthenes is

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evidence for the historical Socrates, see Kahn 1997, 74. On the historicity of the "Socratic method," see Benson 2011, 179–98; on Socrates' use of induction in Plato and Xenophon in this sense, see Gulley 1968, 13–22.

68 E.g., the analogy of defining bees, shape, and color in a universal sense to defining the single essence of virtue (*Meno* 72b, 73e–74b, c); the analogy of standards for determining number, size, or weight to determining a standard for piety (*Euthphr.* 7b–d).

69 On the wall analogy: frr. 134u–v, 106–8; on the shield analogy: fr. 134n.

70 It is found in the fragments of a fourth-century BCE Socratic dialogue accompanied by other analogies of Antisthenes (Luz 2014, 161–91). The "Socratic figure" in it seeks a cure for the effect of the beauty of the second speaker, but finds a moral *xiphos* to defend his virtue when he sees the bad behavior of the latter.

71 Cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1407a10–15 (fr. 51A) on similes, metaphors (*eikones … metaphorai*) in Antisthenes; Xen. *Symp.* 6.8–9 (fr. 51B); Prince 2015, 182–4.

72 Tigner 1970, 1–4; Dancy 2004, 241 on the interpretation of *anamnesis* as a form of deduction.

73 Socrates is repeatedly made to claim that he knows only that he does not know whereas others do not know even that. However, the dramatic situation often implies that he is pretending not to know (in general, see Lane 2011, 237–46). Whether or not the historical Socrates spoke this way (Vlastos 1997, ch. 1; Kahn 1998, 90–1), Plato had him do so as both a prelude and a conclusion to the epistemological analysis set forth in the main body of his dialogues.

often depicted displaying a caustic humor (e.g., fr. 123A–124, 171), he does not generally show the ironic dissimulation characterizing the Platonic Socrates.

Finally, we should recall how the philosophical scenery of Antisthenes' compositions often includes moral discussions between characters of remote history (as between King Cyrus and his courtiers) or between mythical figures (as Heracles/Prometheus and Achilles/Chiron).[74] While it is true that Plato was not averse to including accounts placed in the mouths of mythological characters like the Titan Prometheus, or narrated accounts concerning semi-historical characters like Gyges, these figures are not actual *personae* of his dialogues.[75] Antisthenes' mythical scenes were, by contrast, not only set in dialogue form, but were characterized by the use of direct speech, so that a character like Prometheus could upbraid the hero, Heracles, as vividly as possible. This style of composition thus freed Antisthenes from the chronological and dramatic strictures surrounding the Platonic dialogue. An epic background could concentrate attention on the basic point of the argument.

4 Antisthenes' Socratic Dialogues

Keeping in mind what we found concerning Antisthenes' method of composition, we may now examine the evidence for what the ancients regarded as his "Socratic dialogues." Since this term was used in reference to his *Small Cyrus*, *Lesser Heracles*, and *Alcibiades* (43A),[76] it seems that the mythical/historical dialogues were once considered "Socratic" no less than the *Alcibiades*. Given their episodic structure, it is unlikely that Socrates appeared as the principal speaker throughout these dialogues as he did in those of Plato. Thus imaginary sketches of the lives of Cyrus or Heracles could have been intertwined with episodes taken from the life of Socrates. Antisthenes' composition *Heracles or on Prudence or Strength* (DL 6.18) would be an especially suitable dialogue for discussing his central idea: "for virtue we need nothing additional (*prosdeomenon*) but a Socratic strength (*ischus*)" (fr. 134 c–d; DL 6.11).

74 On these dialogues, see Prince 2015, 144–5.

75 Cf. Prometheus in Pl. *Prt.* 320d–322a and Gyges in *Resp.* 2.359d. Comparable is Xenophon's account of Prodicus' myth of the Choice of Heracles in *Mem.* 2.1.21–34.

76 The exact text is problematic, DL 2.61 (Goulet-Cazé 1999, 268 n. 7, 363 n. 7), but testifies to Antisthenes' authorship of Socratic pieces prior to Pasiphon's criticism (Prince 2015, 165–7). The title *Small Cyrus* could refer either to an *epitome* of the larger volume, or to Cyrus the Younger.

In such a context, the concept of Socrates' strength could refer both to the maintenance of virtue once acquired (*sôphrosunê/enkrateia*) and to its Heraclean acquisition in the face of temptation or difficulties (*karteria/to karterikon*).[77] From surviving fragments, we see that both aspects are central to this particular mythological theme:

1. In one episode of this dialogue, the hero is criticized by the Titan Prometheus as long as he continues his search for things of worldly value (fr. 96);
2. In another, he is praised for seeking out the Centaur Chiron and for submitting to his love (*erôs*) for the sake of education (fr. 92A–E);
3. Elsewhere, Heracles himself hands out moral advice to his fellow-pupils at Chiron's school: that they should take care when conversing with lovers (fr. 94A).

The very assumption that a Socratic strength is the sole requirement (*ouden prosdeomenon*) for leading and/or acquiring the virtuous life presupposes that Socrates himself exemplified it (fr. 134c–d). With similar presuppositions concerning the requirements for a virtuous life, in his *Heracles* and *Cyrus* dialogues Antisthenes is said to have intended to portray the toil (*ponos*) of Heracles and Cyrus as a moral good (*agathon*). In those two dialogues, Antisthenes reportedly made those heroes moral examples so as to prove a universal truth, "drawing on Heracles from the Greeks" and the Persian Cyrus from the barbarians (fr. 85). If Antisthenes similarly portrayed Socrates' moral strength as a needed "role-model" to be admired, he was not going further than other Socratic writers:

1. Xenophon imaginatively reconstructs not only Antisthenes' admiration of Socrates in *Symp.* 4.43–44, but also expressed his own personal feelings for his friend, intimating that Socrates was a moral example to us all (*Mem.* 1.2.62).
2. In Plato, too, Socrates is generally understood as a moral exemplar,[78] even if scholars disagree whether Plato's personal opinion should be identified with any specific view expressed by the characters in his dialogues.[79]

It would be intriguing to know whether Antisthenes extended the allegory of Heracles' toil (*ponos*) to cover Socrates' life-long quest for truth noted by Plato (*Ap.* 38a5). Yet in whatever composition Antisthenes made his assertion

77 *E.g.*, Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.1 (ἐγκράτειαν πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν), 1.5.1–2 (ἐγκράτεια as self-control in general). Fr. 12A, 138B are correct in stating that Antisthenes derived τὸ καρτερικόν/*patientia* from Socrates but probably not the Cynic/Stoic τὸ ἀπαθές/*duritia*.

78 E.g., *Phd.* 118a; *Ep.* 7.324e–325a, even if spurious, may reflect Plato's personal view of Socrates.

79 E.g., Press 2000, 15–82.

concerning Socratic strength, his expression recalls not only Socrates' strength of spirit and prudence indicated by the name of the *Heracles* dialogue, but also a kind of Heraclean physical strength. This is intimated in a sketch of a conversation concerning Socrates' participation in the retreat from the Battle of Delion attributed directly to Antisthenes (fr. 200).[80] There it is supposed that Socrates showed strength of valor on a physical level in addition to that of the spirit.[81] Plato develops an identical theme though in a different military campaign, adding how Socrates surpassed other soldiers both in self-control and in robustness in facing severe weather conditions (*Symp.* 220a–d). Similarly, he attributes to Socrates the ability to remain physically immune from drink no matter how much he imbibes (176c, 214a) and not to drop off like others at a party (223c) but to remain awake and continue with his regular daily routine on the morning thereafter (223d). Antisthenes' theory of education defines this more succinctly: "those who intend to become (morally) good need to train their body with gymnastic (exercises) and their soul with *arguments* (*logois*)" (fr. 163A).[82]

In the same tenor, the sketch of Socrates at the Battle of Delion presupposes his inner and outer strength equally: Socrates was robust not only in body in the face of the enemy, but also in humility in relinquishing the prize for citation of valor to his friend Alcibiades.[83] It would then appear that episodes depicting Socratic strength of spirit and body were used by Antisthenes, throughout different dialogic compositions, to exemplify his notion of virtue and virtuous action.

That other Socratic writers also portrayed their master as a role model raises the question how each explained Socrates' function as a counselor of virtue. This question had been left unresolved from Socrates' trial where he had been

80 Specifically, the Athenian defeat in the Beoetian War in 424 BCE and Socrates' courageous part in the retreat (Nails 2002, 264–5). Antisthenes' remark may originate in *Alcibiades* fr. 43A or the second *Cyrus* dialogue fr. 141A (see also Prince 2015, 683–4). Antisthenes may possibly have been enlisted for the same fray himself, given that he had fought at the Battle of Tanagra only shortly before (426 BCE; fr. 3a = DL 6.1). If so, he would have been an actual eyewitness for the valor that he ascribes to Socrates.

81 Prince 2015, 683–684; Dorion 2014, 286–288.

82 The word <*logois*> is missing from the text, but something like this should be supplied (Prince 2015, 547–8). The notion of *double training* of body and soul associated with Diogenes the Cynic could have been derived from Antisthenes' notion of Socrates' inner and outer strength.

83 Although Antisthenes makes Socrates deny that he received a citation for valor at the Battle of Delion since it was awarded to Alcibiades, Socrates' anonymous friends there replied that rumor had it that Socrates was the one "who gave it to him [Alcibiades]" (fr. 200). Setting aside the question of historicity, the testimony shows that Antisthenes believes Socrates relinquished, from modesty, a prize that others considered was his due.

accused of claiming to teach virtue while corrupting his students in doing so.[84] Sometime after Socrates' execution (399 BCE), the sophist-orator Polycrates supposedly expanded on the theme of Socrates' corruption of the youth even further.[85] In this respect, Antisthenes' portrayal of Socrates was different from that of other Socratic writers.[86] Since he believed that virtue could actually be taught (*didaktê*), even in its briefest form (fr. 99), he is unlikely to have denied that his Socrates taught others. In fact, even Xenophon imagines Antisthenes involved in a discussion with Socrates concerning virtue as a subject both taught and learned. He also imagines Antisthenes explaining how he acquired (viz. learned) this philosophy from Socrates himself (*Symp.* 4.43; fr. 82).[87] Thus, while Plato devoted much space to portraying Socrates' epistemological ignorance (*amathia*) and denial of any ability to give formal teaching, Antisthenes and even Xenophon were less preoccupied with these issues, rather than with the question: How did Socrates fail to impart it in certain cases? This question is connected primarily with the apologetics of Socratic literature subtly running through the dialogues of Plato and more overtly in Xenophon. Although we have so little evidence for Antisthenes, it is interesting to note that the fragment concerning the Battle of Delion presupposes Socrates' close relations with Alcibiades (fr. 200).[88] Antisthenes' account then seems to have taken into consideration this criticism of his mentor's personal relationship with his notoriously failed "pupil." Antisthenes' theory of education demanded that his own pupils keep their "wit" (*nous*) about them if they wished to study morality.[89]

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84 Socrates defends himself against the slander both that he corrupted (*diaphtheirai*) the youth (Pl. *Ap.* 24b–c) in his education (*paideia*) of them (Xen. *Ap.* 18–20) and that he was a sophistic educator (Pl. *Ap.* 19e) who could teach that art (20b–c).

85 Probably between 393–380 BCE (Nails 2002, 252–3). Some doubt that the Socratics saw Polycrates' work as needing a response (Kahn 1994, 105–6), but many scholars see him as a specific target in their writings, e.g., Nails 2002, 304 on Xen. *Mem.* 1.1–2. See Murphy (in this volume) for details.

86 Plato flatly denied that Socrates ever taught virtue, claiming that he had no knowledge of his own (*Ap.* 23a–d). Other writers, such as Aeschines, portrayed Socrates as breaking down Alcibiades' conceit while displaying knowledge of how to upbraid him (Kahn 1994, 93–4; 1998, 19–23; Mársico 2018, 202–3). Xenophon maintains that Socrates was a counselor, but refers to his education of the soul (e.g., τήν τε ψυχὴν ἐπαίδευσε καὶ τὸ σῶμα: *Mem.* 1.3.5).

87 The view that virtue is *didakton* and *mathêton* (2.6; fr. 103A) is ascribed to him and another speaker (Prince 2015, 338–9). He tells Callias that it is indisputable (*anamphilogôtatê*) that virtue is taught (Xen. *Symp.* 3.4–5; fr. 78).

88 Cf. εὐφήμει, ὦ ξένε· as a reply to critics (fr. 200; Prince 2015, 338–9; and the Socratic introduction to fr. 175).

89 Cf. Luz 2015, 201, 208 on fr. 171 (DL 6.3): to study under Antisthenes would require "a book and wit, a pen and wit, and a notebook and wit (βιβλαρίου καινοῦ καὶ γραφείου καινοῦ καὶ πινακιδίου καινοῦ)" with the famous play on the words καινοῦ "new" and καὶ νοῦ "and wit."

On allegedly disbanding them when he became a disciple of Socrates, he bade his former pupils go to his new master, but take their wit with them (fr. 12B). Its loss was considered equivalent to moral suicide.[90] In these terms, a pupil's failure to learn morality could be described as a sort of *anoia* ("lack of *nous*," "folly") regarding the meaning of virtue, relegating the failed pupil to a place beyond the responsibility of his teacher.[91]

Antisthenes' explanation for Socrates' failure to instill virtue in Alcibiades is set forth in a fragmentary Greco-Roman dialogue examining failure and success in the arts and sciences.[92] Its anonymous author quotes two sketchy conversations: one featuring Socrates (ll. 19–25), and another immediately following it, featuring Antisthenes himself (ll. 25–36). Although only the second is normally cited in our fragments (fr. 175), it is clear that both sketches are part of a single argument forming a contextual and logical unit.[93] In each case, the philosopher is addressed by anonymous critics concerning a pupil's corruption at a *deipnic* (viz. sympotic) event, from which they themselves had been absent.[94] In the first case, Socrates is asked how he had not succeeded in making Alcibiades a better person although the latter had spent so long with him as his pupil. His answer is that what "I teach (*didaxô*) him by day," "others unravel (*analuousin*) by night." The tenses indicate a recurrent process whereby Socrates' web of argument is repeatedly unraveled at night, much like Penelope's web in the *Odyssey*. In this case, his daily argumentation is untaught by suitors for Alcibiades' attention who deconstruct his moral theory nocturnally.[95] The most likely ambience for such an event in fifth-century Athens would be some nocturnal sympotic venue, where Alcibiades forgot or disregarded Socrates' teaching in the philosopher's absence. This situation is clarified in the adjoining anecdote, concerning a conversation held

90 Fr. 105: Give him "either *nous* or the noose (*brochos*)"; by contrast Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.16: Critias and Alcibiades would rather die than live like Socrates all their lives.

91 Xenophon accepts that some philosophers claim that one cannot truly unlearn virtue, but believes that there are those who are mentally incapable of grasping it just as there are those who are physically incapable of achieving certain learnable actions (*Mem.* 1.2.19).

92 Partially preserved in *Pap. Flor.* 113 II. 19–36, edited and discussed in Luz 2014, 14–15; 2015, 192–210.

93 The content, style, and philosophical character of both conversations are similar and originally formed a single argument in the papyrus dialogue (Luz 2015, 192–210). The first sketch, Socrates' conversation concerning Alcibiades, has been treated as a general Socratic anecdote in spite of its Antisthenean presuppositions and contextual link with the second fragment (fr. 175).

94 Luz 2014, 14–17.

95 The Penelope's web analogy was perhaps philosophically interpreted in Antisthenes' discourses *On Helen and Penelope* and *On Odysseus and Penelope*. Cf. fr. 188B; also Prince 2015, 158–9.

between Antisthenes and unnamed critics about a pupil of his own (fr. 175). The latter had attended a feast (*deipnon*) fêted by Antisthenes' rivals in love (*anterastai*), who succeeded in seducing the lad with an exorbitant meal of which Antisthenes entirely disapproved. However, given the *deipnic*/sympotic atmosphere and the emphasis on love alluded to in the fragment,[96] it is likely that we are speaking principally of the lad's moral downfall and not just his eating habits. As in the previous case of Socrates and Alcibiades, Antisthenes' teaching lost its effect when the lad was absent from him.[97]

This approach clearly differs from what is imagined in the *Symposium*s of Plato and Xenophon. In that of Xenophon, Antisthenes is ironically cast as a fellow-participant alongside Socrates, but personally exemplifies the success of Socrates' educative use of *erôs* (*Symp.* 4.42–4, 8.5–6).[98] In Plato, by contrast, Socrates is one whose philosophy of *erôs* is depicted not just as an apparent success (*Symp.* 173b–c), but also as a failure in the case of Alcibiades (212c–215a, 216d–218e). However, in the two papyrus anecdotes just discussed, both Socrates and Antisthenes were implicitly critical of these *symposia*, considering them unfit venues for philosophy. In fact, the failure of their respective pupils was ascribed explicitly to their participation in such events.

The notion of the educative role of *erôs* is well established in the Socratic tradition.[99] In spite of Antisthenes' criticism of *erôs* and even pleasure in general, the interpretation that he believed that it should be sublimated rather than eliminated is most probably correct.[100] On the other hand, the papyrus anecdotes concerning Socrates and Antisthenes emphasize the concept of teaching virtue through philosophical or virtuous love although it could be thwarted by an immoral *erôs* encountered by their pupils at the *symposia* from which they themselves had been absent.[101] It is the actual presence of Socrates and Antisthenes—rather than their arguments—that was here supposed to keep their wards in tow prior to achieving strength of prudence.

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96 Antisthenes is described as in love (*eran*, l. 27) with the lad—and his rivals are rival suitors (*anterastai*, l. 33), much like Penelope's suitors from two lines earlier. Events like these were usually preceded by a banquet/meal *deipnon* before the "boozy" section, viz. the *symposion* itself.

97 Plutarch refers to this tradition, describing how Alcibiades slipped away from Socrates in order to enjoy himself with others (*Alc.* 6), citing Antisthenes incidentally.

98 There is thus double irony: Antisthenes as a participant at a sympotic event that he had criticized, and Socrates' jocular references to Antisthenes as a panderer of love.

99 Kahn 1998, ch. 9 (Plato); Kahn 1994, 87–106 (Aeschines); Danzig 2005, 331–357 (Xenophon's "sanitization" of Plato).

100 Prince 2015, 375–6.

101 Although Socrates' love for Alcibiades is not mentioned in the papyrus fragment, the latter's companions at his nocturnal trysts analogously serve as Penelope's rival suitors who here "unravel" Alcibiades' web of loyalty to Socrates' love.

A similar situation is described in a papyrus fragment of a lost dialogue from the period in which Antisthenes was active.[102] There a Socratic *erastês* chastises a younger *erômenos* for abandoning his company and committing moral crimes in his absence.[103] However, in spite of the similarity of its ideas and terminology, there is no direct evidence that this fragment is by Antisthenes himself. It has been suggested that Antisthenes' *Protrepticus*-series of discourses is a possible source for these discussions of the educative value of *erôs* and the failure of certain pupils of Socrates and Antisthenes.[104] Part of this series does seem to have been sympotic in content, including a short vignette of Socrates' criticism of wine-drinking at a symposium (fr. 64A–B).[105] As in the previous fragment concerning Socrates and Alcibiades, the *Protrepticus* did not clearly depict Socrates as taking part at that symposium himself, but was rather critical of it as a venue for acquiring virtue.[106] Such a situation would be totally different from that conjured up by Plato and Xenophon in their respective *Symposia*, in which Socrates participates fully.[107] From these fragments we may conclude that Antisthenes believed in the educative role of *erôs*, but that the close friendship of teacher and pupil was a *sine qua non* for its success. In contrast, Plato's discussion of the educative role of *erôs* in the *Symposium* is exemplified by Socrates' supposed study under Diotima with its failure exemplified in the speech of Alcibiades.[108]

Another sketch directly attributed to Antisthenes describes the effect of Socrates' spirit on a foreign beloved (*erômenos*), who reached Athens only

102 *PErl.* 4 = Pack no. 2103, Merkelbach 1958, no. 1099. Although the papyrus is dated to the second or third century CE, it is written in Attic Greek of the fifth or fourth century BCE, albeit in a simple, stark style of its own.

103 The discussion concerns cures for the desire of the beautiful—and, by implication, the meaning of moral beauty itself.

104 DL 6.1–2; Prince 2015, 137–8. The genre of protreptic compositions was dedicated to the encouragement to turn to philosophy and the virtuous life. Antisthenes' work could have been a source for Xenophon's dramatization of a protreptic discussion between Antisthenes and Socrates (*Mem.* 2.5.1) which Xenophon claims to have heard somewhere.

105 Prince 2015, 137–138, 244–5: there Socrates notes that the custom of drinking from the *bombulios* wine-bibbing jug leads to less drunkenness than free access to the common *phialê* at *symposia* (64A). In Pl. *Symp.* 176a, c, Pausanias suggests a limit for the company's drinking even though Socrates was not to be so restricted.

106 Luz 2014, 14. Similar is the *deipnon* in which Antisthenes did not take part (fr. 175) and the events in which Alcibiades participated when Socrates was not present.

107 I have suggested elsewhere that Antisthenes' sympotic discussion was prior the Plato's *Symposium*, which opens with a long and intricate rejection of previous attempts to describe Socrates at such events (172b–173b; Luz 2014, 14–16).

108 Luz 2014, 161–191, on possible links with the Antistheneans if not Antisthenes himself.

after the philosopher's death and was greatly affected by a visit to his tomb.[109] Elsewhere, this dream motive is portrayed more realistically, describing the effect of Socrates' memory on his followers (*erastai*) and directly leading to the punishment meted out on Anytus and Meletus for having instigated Socrates' execution.[110] In contrast to Plato's other-worldly account in the *Phaedo* (109a–115b), Antisthenes apparently maintained that to live piously and justly was the way to bequeath an eternal memory and that this was the case of Socrates' *post mortem* memory among his disciples.[111] This dialogue seems to describe how Socrates' memory was cherished by his followers, much as Plato's *Phaedo* did (57a–59c, 118a), and to suggest that since his spirit reappeared from the tomb, there is perhaps an understanding that it still somehow existed.

Finally, we may briefly examine the imaginary speeches and conversations dramatized in Xenophon. In the first speech (*Symp.* 4.34–45), Antisthenes explains to Socrates and the rest of the company the grounds for his argument that wealth and poverty reside in the soul rather than in the home. This attitude to life awarded him freedom to practice philosophy and released him from unnecessary social and political chores (fr. 82). He then attributes this teaching to Socrates, who taught Antisthenes how to spend his days freely (*scholazôn sundiêmereuein*) with his mentor. Although there are many Platonic borrowings in this passage in addition to Xenophon's own invention,[112] the basic philosophy that Xenophon attributes to Antisthenes could well be authentic. However, it is impossible to know whether Antisthenes attributed this philosophy to Socrates in his original works, or whether this was an attempt of Xenophon's to deflate Antisthenes' originality. It is even difficult to assess which of the analogies that Xenophon uses to prove his argument could be developed from Antisthenes' original compositions, even though they do sound authentic. Later, Socrates returns the compliment that Antisthenes

109 Antisthenes' *Cyrsas or the Beloved* is a likely source (fr. 41A l. 73, 84A; Prince 2015, 161, 303–4), but the surviving testimony (fr. 84B) has conflated the account with supernatural content, relating the appearance of Socrates' apparition to Cyrsas of Chios in a dream at his tomb-side (Prince 2015, 305–6).

110 Fr. 84c = ps.-Soc. *Ep.* 17 (supposedly Aeschines) to a Chian. See Prince 2015, 307–8; Trapp 2003, 68–70, 215. On Antisthenes' special interest in the fate of Anytus and Meletus, see fr. 21 (DL 6.9–10).

111 Fr. 176 (DL 6.5): those who wish to be immortal need to live piously and justly. There is little to show that Antisthenes developed an eschatology, although interesting testimony about his philosophy of nature and theology exist: see Prince 2015, 568–83. In contrast to Antisthenes' drama around Socrates' alleged tomb, Plato has Socrates explicitly deny interest in whether his remains should be cremated or buried, as if that tomb were unknown to the author (*Phd.* 115c; Prince 2015, 308–9).

112 Prince 2015, 285–98.

gave him (*Symp.* 4.56–64) by making Antisthenes heir to his own philosophy of friendship (*philia*) and love (*erôs*): the bonds between individuals of society need the assistance of intermediaries like himself and Antisthenes in order to match or reconcile them (fr. 13A).[113] We do learn from Antisthenes' biography about the importance to him of a philosophical, spiritual love (DL 6.12, 105): only the good person is worthy of love (*axierastos*) and the moral are his friends (fr. 99, 134). If the speech that Xenophon creates for Socrates reflects anything of this, then his joke about Antisthenes as a match-maker would refer to his theory of philosophical love.[114] However, we should not forget that in Xenophon's account it is Socrates, rather than Antisthenes, who presents this philosophy. Thus we do not know how much of Socrates' speech represents Xenophon's personal understanding and portrayal of Socrates, and how much it reflects Antisthenes' previous presentation of his mentor's teaching.

5 Conclusion: The Portrayal of Socrates

Much of Antisthenes' portrayal of Socrates remains enigmatic. This is caused not only by the dearth of authentic quotations but also by the episodic structure of his dialogues. In them Antisthenes delineated only brief sketches of Socrates' conversations, intermittently; thus much of their context eludes us. However, if his portrayals of Chiron and Prometheus were prototypes for his image of Socrates, then his mentor would have been presented as a wise guide seeking to impart virtue to others through the protreptic force of his personality and example. He was thus not responsible for pupils like Alcibiades who, no longer in his company, were corrupted by others.

Judging from the methodology of Antisthenes' argumentation, we would expect him to have shown how his mentor sought the correct definition of ethical values, but avoided the invention of intricate refutations. Socratic *aporia* would be the result of overly detailed discussions of the qualities of virtue at the cost of examining its simple meaning. In this sense, Antisthenes' portrayal of Socrates would have lacked much of the argumentation typifying Socrates' inquiry in the Platonic dialogues.[115] Although this leaves us with a no-less-enigmatic picture of the historical Socrates, Antisthenes does help us

113 Prince 2015, 52–3, on the joke of Socrates and Antisthenes as procurers (*proagôgos*/*mastropos*) attempting to cater to the tastes of their friends.

114 See Prince 2015, 256–7, on fr. 69 as Philodemus' reply to Antisthenes and Socrates that they could not reconcile individuals to society, but only to themselves.

115 Later anecdotes make metaphysical and ontological assumptions the basis for friction between Plato and Antisthenes (frr. 148, 149A–C).

understand the way in which Socrates' philosophy was absorbed by his pupils. It was finally Antisthenes and not Plato or Xenophon who was in the close coterie of loyal companions standing by Socrates' side at his execution. If there is substance to his account of Cyrsas' dream, Antisthenes would apparently have remembered with reverence not only the event, but also the place where his master was buried.

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